deliberately or inadvertently conceals, misrepresents, or falsifies relevant information. 6 Proof that a patent is invalid-that it should not have been issuedis a complete defense to an infringement action brought under that patent, 7 but it is not a ground for an affirmative action for damages. The patentee thus retains undeserved gains reaped from an invalid patent prior to a judgment of invalidity. Moreover, the patent statutes generally do not penalize deliberate attempts to deceive the Patent Office s by misrepresenting, falsifying, or concealing relevant information. 9 Under certain judicially created doctrines, fraud on the Patent Office is a ground for cancellation of a patent, 10 a defense to an infringement suit," and an element of certain antitrust causes of action. 12 This comment suggests that existing statutory and judicial sanctions provide inadequate deterrence and redress for fraud on the Patent Office and proposes several legal theories that offer more effective sanctions. 13 
I. PRESENT REMEDIES A. The Cancellation Suit
The federal government has the right, inherent in its constitutional power to grant patents, to sue for cancellation of a patent for fraud in its procurement. 4 Cancellation terminates patent rights ab initio; 1 the patentee can no longer sue to enforce patent rights, and licensees are entitled to recoup royalties paid prior to cancellation.
Private parties cannot sue for cancellation, 16 and the government rarely seeks this remedy.' 7 Cancellation is therefore an inadequate procedure for remedying and deterring patent fraud.
B. The Unenforceability Defense
Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co. established that fraud in the procurement of a patent is however, the proposition supports this comment's view that available remedies provide insufficient incentive to private actions for fraud. It is uncertain whether the Federal Trade Commission will take significant action under American Cyanamid Co., 63 F.T.C. 1747, 1857-62 (1963) A material misrepresentation requirement calls for proof that, on the true facts, the patent should not have been issued. Presumably, a meritorious patent application will be approved at some point in the issuance process; thus, fraud in such a patent application is not a material cause of issuance. This requirement sharply limits the value of the defense of unenforceability as a sanction for fraudulent procurement of a patent. 2 The defendant in an infringement action has no additional incentive to prove material fraud, because proof that the patent should not have been issued (irrespective of whether issuance is due to fraud) is in itself a complete defense to an infringement action 2 3 Furthermore, the sanctions imposed on the patentee for fraud and for mere invalidity are identical. 
1972).
This common law sanction for fraud is arbitrary in its operation. First, the harm caused by the fraudulent claim is measured by its commercial success, but the severity of the sanction depends on the commercial success of the other claims. Since different claims may vary in commercial success, the sanction could be less severe than the initial harm. Second, even if the severity of the sanction approaches the severity of the initial harm to competitors, the common law rule does not effectively redress the harm to an alleged infringer. Third, although the value a patentee has gained from a fraudulent claim increases as the term of the patent expires, the severity of the sanction diminishes because the voided claims have a shorter term to run.
25 Cf.
Rosenberg, The Assertion of a Fraud Upon the Patent Office as a Means of De-
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enforceability fails to redress the harm caused by the invalid patent prior to adjudication; the patentee retains prior profits made through use of the patent rights. The unenforceability defense also fails to deter the patent applicant who could not, on the actual facts, procure a patent; misrepresentation is costless 26 and may yield a patent that produces gains until a court determines that it was procured by fraud.
27
C. The Antitrust Sanction
An effective remedy for fraud on the Patent Office would redress harm caused by the fraud by requiring the patentee to disgorge profits obtained through the use of the patent prior to a declaration of invalidity. Indeed, to deter fraud the expected damages must exceed the expected gains to the patentee from fraud. In Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 28 the Supreme Court indicated that such a remedy might be available to private parties under section 2 of the Sherman Act 2 9 Although conduct otherwise violative of the antitrust laws is normally protected from prosecution by a patent, 30 32 An assignee of the patentee retains antitrust immunity unless it is shown that the assignee was aware of the patentee's fraud. 382 U.S. at 177 & n.5, 179 (Harlan, J., concurring). 83 Rosenberg, supra note 25, at 484-85.
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Fraud on the Patent Office failed in nineteen of twenty cases. 34 The doctrine has several critical problems that limit its effectiveness as a sanction for fraud.
1.
The "Significant Competition" Limitation. The Walker Process sanction reaches only fraudulently procured patents that result in "monopoly" within the meaning of the antitrust laws. 35 Since a patented invention may be subject to significant economic competition from substitute products, 30 377 (1956) , illustrates the distinction between control of a single product and control of a market. Although defendant Du Pont accounted for 75 percent of domestic cellophane sales by virtue of its almost exclusive knowledge of the process of manufacturing cellophane, the Court held that it had not monopolized in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. The opinion did not rest on Du Pont's lack of the 100 percent dominance that a patent on cellophane would have conferred; rather, the Court recognized that other flexible packaging materials were so similar to cellophane that the relevant market for a monopoly determination was the market for all flexible packaging materials. Du Pont's share of the sales of flexible packaging materials was too small to justify a conclusion that it had monopolized that market.
tion on Walker Process is sensible-antitrust penalties should not be imposed on fraudulent patentees who have not caused harm of the degree and kind contemplated by the antitrust laws-but it is also a major limitation on the effectiveness of the sanction because few patents are basic enough to allow monopoly of an entire field. Most are for patentable but minor improvements on the prior art. Walker Process thus can neither redress the harm these patents cause a patentee's potential competitors nor force the patentee to disgorge the profits obtained under a fraudulent nonmonopolistic patent.
The Walker Process doctrine's inability to reach patents that are not monopolistic in the antitrust sense also weakens its force as a deterrent to fraudulent applications for patents that do not result in the degree of monopoly required by section 2 of the Sherman Act. The doctrine may fail to discourage fraud even in cases that might result in monopoly when the holder of a basic patent permits competing parties to manufacture and sell the patented invention. Significant price competition among infringers and licensees could negate the degree of monopoly essential to a Walker Process claim3 7 2. The "Material Fraud" Limitation. Lower courts have consistently interpreted Walker Process to require a claimant to prove material fraud. 88 The claimant must show that the patent should not have been issued and that the patentee's fraud was the cause of the error. In many cases, however, the cause of the error cannot be ascertained. Although certain statutory requirements for patentability are relatively objec.
87 It should also be noted that the existence of a licensee might negate a claim for attempting to monopolize. Nonetheless, infringers and licensees are harmed by the fraudulent patent; but for the patent, infringers would have been able to compete more vigorously, see note 47 infra, and licensees would have avoided royalty payments.
Of the twenty cases listed in note 34 supra, sixteen involved Walker Process counterclaims to infringement suits. This suggests either that infringers are the parties most likely to have sufficient financial interests to justify litigation, or that fraud is unlikely to be detected except in discovery during a suit brought on other grounds. Thus, Walker Process The examiner is not required to give reasons for his decision,4 and the Patent Office forbids explanatory testimony by the examiners in private litigation. 43 Thus, if sanctions are imposed only for material fraud, meritorious claims may be denied for failure of proof.
This problem of proof of material fraud is especially acute in light of the Walker Process monopoly requirement. The courts have noted that the commercial success of a patented invention is strong, though not conclusive, evidence that the invention was indeed patentable. Since monopolization implies commercial success, it indicates that fraud relevant to whether the patented invention was new, useful, or nonobvious was probably not material.
The Costs of Walker Process
Litigation. The Walker Process claimant will incur expenses in addition to the notoriously high costs normally associated with antitrust litigation. 45 A Walker Process claimant must show conduct by the patentee that meets a more narrow definition of fraud than that required for unenforceability. 46 Moreover, to prove materiality the claimant must prove the patent's invalidity; experience in other contexts has shown that the expense can discourage litigation. 47 Finally, the claimant must prove that use of the 1970) . 47 The costs of a patent lawsuit "can overwhelm a defendant quite as much as losing it," and it is commonly recognized that some patentees "assert their patents not to vindicate their rights, but to harass competitors by burdensome patent infringement litigation or fraudulent patent generated the patentee's monopoly. 48 Although the prospect of a significant recovery under the treble damage provisions of the Clayton Act 49 may offset a claimant's reluctance to risk the major expense of a Walker Process claim, certain practical considerations vitiate the treble damages incentive.
First, the prospect of substantial recovery is of no value to a claimant who cannot afford the initial costs of litigation," 0 and the claimant who can afford to litigate must discount the fruits of a successful claim by the probability of failure; the low success rate of Walker Process (1970) . Moreover, that provision does not operate "until after litigation has occurred, and the outlay required to try a lawsuit presenting validity issues is the factor which undoubtedly forces many alleged infringers into accepting licenses rather than litigating." Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 813, 347-48 (1971) .
51 See text and note at note 34 supra. Moreover, there is reason to believe that Walker Process claims are not settled as frequently as other private antitrust actions. Since a private antitrust action often follows successful prosecution by the government, Posner, supra note 34, at 372, the ability to plead the prior judgment as evidence of an antitrust violation, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1970), facilitates settlement of the claim. In patent fraud cases, however, the prior judgment is almost always unavailable, because the government rarely acts against fraud on the Patent Office. Moreover, if the government action is a cancellation suit, it cannot be pleaded as evidence under 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1970).
(41:775 claimant has unique incentives to settle and obtain a share of the monopoly profits by accepting a license under the fraudulent patent. If there are no other licensees, the patentee will be the claimant's only competitor.
52 A settlement, though redressing the harm the licensee has suffered from the fraudulent patent, allows harm to others to continue because the patent remains valid and enforceable. The patentee and the licensee, in a two-seller market, can charge a higher price for the patented product than would prevail under full competition.
II. PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR FRAUD ON THE PATENT OFFICE
Unlike the Walker Process doctrine, an effective remedy for fraudulent patent procurement should not be limited to monopoly markets, r 5 require proof of material fraud, 54 or subject the claimant to excessive litigation costs. 5 5 Unlike the defense of unenforceability, 6 it should provide full compensatory damages to parties injured by patent fraud. Furthermore, an effective remedy should provide punitive damages to deter fraud. Damages have neither been awarded nor demanded 8 from the patentee in actions for fraud on the Patent Office other than antitrust actions. Courts, however, have long awarded both compensatory and punitive damages in other fraud cases. 59 A common law fraud remedy in patent fraud actions could redress harm through compensatory damages and deter fraud by patent applicants through punitive damages.
Private suits for damages for patent fraud can meet the five requirements" 0 of the common law misrepresentation doctrine. 6 56 See text and notes at notes 18-27 supra. 57 A risk neutral patentee will engage in fraud only if the expected gains from a fraudulent patent application (including potential monopoly profits) exceed the expected costs (compensatory and punitive damages). The gains from fraud will never be less than compensatory damages, and may actually exceed them if some victims fail to recover or if the patentee reaps monopoly profits. Thus, without punitive damages there is no significant deterrent to fraud. fraud by definition includes a false representation. 6 The defrauding patentee knows that the representation is false and intends to induce the injured parties and putative plaintiffs-potential competitors, their customers, and the patentee's customers-to act or refrain from acting in reliance on the patent. 3 That plaintiffs act in reliance on the fraud is established when the representation concerning patentability plays a substantial part in the competitors' decisions to stay out of the market, or in the customers' decisions to buy from the patentee and not from a competitor. 64 Finally, the plaintiffs suffer actual damages as a result of the fraud, due to either higher prices (customers) or lost profits (competitors).
In decisions in other fields, courts have indicated the factors relevant to an award of punitive damages: the potency of other sanctions, the .impact of the label "fraudulent" on the defendant's business, the danger that the size of the total award could not be controlled in a series of actions by different parties on the same fraud, and the availability of class actions, which render unnecessary the use of punitive damages to encourage litigation of small claims. 65 Under these guidelines, punitive damages are appropriate-in patent fraud cases. The impotence of present remedies has already been noted, 6 6 a patentee will not suffer greatly from loss of a reputation for honesty, 67 and the possibility of excessive damages is smaller under common law theories that give courts discretion to award less than the treble damages required in Walker Process cases. Punitive damages are thus appropriate, since they would perform a needed deterrent function and their negative aspects would be minimized. Class actions would presumably be available for patent fraud claims, and the joint interests of putative infringers would provide incentives both to dis-62 See note 6 supra. 63 Although the misrepresentation is made directly to the Patent Office rather than to the injured parties, the patentee can be held liable under common law doctrine. When the plaintiff is an unidentified member of a group and the defendant has reason to expect that a member of the group will be reached and influenced by the fraud, the courts will impose liability for intentional deceit. Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. Rav. 231, 246 (1966) .
The intent is not merely that the Patent Office grant a patent in reliance on the fraud; the patentee also intends that in reliance on the allegation and appearance of patentability customers and competitors will hesitate to infringe or challenge the fraudulently procured patent.
64 There is no common law requirement of 'but for' materiality. W. cover fraud and to litigate claims. 6 But even if these incentives could assure enforcement, punitive damages are necessary to make that enforcement effective
B. Antitrust Remedies
Under the Walker Process doctrine, a fraudulently procured patent does not protect a patentee from liability for monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act.69 This restriction on immunity to antitrust prosecution should be expanded to reach other provisions of the antitrust laws. The following sections critically examine several theories under which a patentee could be subjected to antitrust liability for a fraudulent patent.
Patents as Contracts in Restraint of Trade.
A patent can be viewed as a contract between the patentee and the government with disclosure of the invention 7 as consideration for a legally enforceable right to exclude others temporarily from its exploitation. Since a patent obviously restrains trade, it could qualify as a "contract... in restraint of trade" prohibited by section 1 of the Sherman Act.
7 ' Extension of the Walker Process doctrine to section 1 of the Sherman Act would make antitrust sanctions available for use against fraudulently procured patents. Damages for fraud would run from the day the patent was issued.
Courts have not fully defined the term "contract" as used in the antitrust statute. 72 Patents have occasionally been called contracts, but decisions in these cases have not turned on the description. 73 Because characterization of a patent as a contract could have consequences be-68 Defensive action based on these joint interests raises other problems. In one case, for example, a group of putative infringers agreed that each would contribute to the defense of any member of the group sued by the patentee for infringement. Although the court found the agreement unobjectionable, it held that an ancillary agreement that no member would accept or negotiate a license without first notifying the others violated 69 See text and notes at notes 29-32 supra. 70 The public benefits from this disclosure in that the invention is available for public use after the patent expires. Furthermore, even before the patent expires the technology it discloses may stimulate further invention. yond the context of fraud, it may be undesirable to suggest the characterization solely to provide a remedy for fraud on the Patent Office.
Licenses as Contracts in Restraint of
Trade. An agreement by which one party contracts not to manufacture a given article, or to manufacture it only upon payment of a royalty, usually constitutes a restraint of trade. 7 4 A patent license involving similar restraints is immune from antitrust prosecution because it partially waives the patentee's right to exclude competitors entirely; when complete exclusion is permissible, partial exclusion is, by comparison, an expansion of trade. 75 Under an extension of the Walker Process doctrine, however, a fraudulently procured patent would no longer protect the license from prosecution under section 1 of the Sherman Act as a "contract in restraint of trade."
This approach would not significantly expand the sanctions for patent fraud. Only those harmed by antitrust violations may bring private actions for redress. 7 6 Although the licensee and consumers of the patented item are damaged by restrictions on the licensee's ability to compete, unlicensed competitors prodded into investigating the history of the patent under the threat of an infringement suit are most likely to discover the fraud. These unlicensed competitors suffer injury because of the fraud, but they are not harmed by the licensee's impaired ability to compete. On the contrary, they benefit because the licensed competitor's prices must reflect the royalties required by the license. Thus, the parties most likely to discover the fraud are those who cannot, on this restraint of trade theory, bring an action based on the fraud because they have not been injured by the license contract.
tracts that prolong a restraint of trade through licensing of fraudulent patents should be sanctioned as severely. The parties injured by an agreement that conceals patent unenforceability include all who have an interest in challenging the patent, especially alleged infringers. This theory would therefore provide alleged infringers an additional method to attack fraudulent patents. The gravamen of the claim would be that the patentee perpetuated a restraint of trade by issuing a license and thereby discouraging the licensee from discovering and revealing the patent fraud.
The sanction would be limited to a patentee who either knew that the patent was unenforceable or knew the facts leading to that legal conclusion when issuing the license, 78 that is, a patentee who has deliberately committed fraud on the Patent Office that would render the patent unenforceable. If unenforceability does not require proof of material fraud, 79 all the elements of unenforceability are within the fraudulent patentee's knowledge.
There are significant problems of proof in determining the appropriate amount of damages, especially if damages were to run from the date that, but for the license, the licensee would have obtained a judicial declaration of the invalidity of the patent. Of course, since the license is the agreement that effects perpetuation of the restraint of trade, the latter problem could be solved by measuring damages from the date the license was granted.
4. Exclusive Dealing. Consumers and sellers of infringing goods purchased from a patentee's unlicensed competitors are liable as infringers of the patentee's patent. 8 0 If a patent is ostensibly valid, customers will often choose to buy from the patentee rather than an allegedly infringing seller to avoid this liability. In the case of a unenforceable involved fraudulent agreements rather than unilateral fraud by the patent applicant. E.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945) (unclean hands); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944) . No court, in cases decided after Walker Process, has dealt with the argument that a fraudulent agreement would meet the "contract, combination, or conspiracy" requirement of section I of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
78 This limitation is necessary to allow settlement of a patent dispute by issuing a license. When a fraudulent patentee contests a challenge to a patent, hope of success is based not on a belief in the validity of the patent but on the hope that the challenger will be unable to prove the underlying fraud. From the fraudulent patentee's viewpoint, the settlement of a patent dispute represents an arrangement to continue exploitation of a fraudulent patent, rather than a compromise of an unresolved dispute. Thus, application of antitrust sanctions to licenses under fraudulent patents will not deter attempts to settle bona fide disputes under nonfraudulent patents by issuing licenses.
fraudulently procured patent; sales to customers may violate the prohibition in section 3 of the Clayton Act against "a sale or contract for 
. ",s
The requisite effect on competition under this provision of the Clayton Act is less than that required for monopolization under the Sherman Act. 8 2 The Clayton Act deals with a "substantial lessening" of competition and use of the word "may" indicates that a potential lessening may suffice. 3 Furthermore, a patent "is at least prima facie evidence" of the power to cause this effect on competition "although in fact there may be many competing substitutes for the patented article." 8 4 Relevant market inquiry would therefore be unnecessary when the Clayton Act is used to attack a fraudulently procured patent.
The "understanding" that a customer will not purchase the goods 8 5 of a competitor is usually not explicit in sales agreements for patented goods, but may reasonably be read into the sale when the customer knows that the good is patented and that purchases from the patentee's competitor involve potential liability for infringement. 8 " This knowledge is usually present when the patentee informs the customer or the trade that the competitor is infringing, or when the patentee threatens litigation.
This remedy would be available to potential and actual purchasers and users of the patented good. Under an extension of Walker Process, this proposed antitrust remedy would reach only holders of fraudulently procured patents; bona fide patentees would be protected by the principle that protects a valid patent monopoly.
CONCLUSIONS
Current remedies for fraud on the Patent Office--cancellation of the patent, the defense of unenforceability, and the Walker Process antitrust suit-are unable to deter patent fraud and redress effectively the harm caused by that fraud. This comment has proposed several approaches under the common law doctrine of misrepresentation and the antitrust laws that provide more effective deterrence and relief. Although each approach presents difficulties, together they may expand the category of potential plaintiffs, simplify the burden of proof, and permit recovery of fill compensation and punitive damages.
